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STATEMENT
Plaintiffs believe that the issues are fairly raised by
defendants' "Statement of Points on Appeal" (Brief,
page 8) and Wft shall meet those points in the order presented in defendants' argument.
We do not subscribe to defendants' "Statement of
the Case" (Brief, pages 1-8) nor to their analysis of relevant statutes and decisions.
In so far as the facts are concerned defendants write
as though the trial judge had not disbelieved them on
crucial disputed testimony and had not found in plaintiffs' favor on plaintiffs' undisputed testimony. In so far
as the law is concerned defendants write as though during the past decade no statutes had been enacted (Utah
Righ't to Work law of 1955), regulations promulgated
(N. l. R. B. "jurisdictional yardstick" regulations of 1954,
infra), or decisions enunciated (inter alia, the Hanke case
of 1950, anc;J other "post-Taft-Hartley" decisions, infra).
In the course of our documenting the record which
sustains the decision of the court on the particular matters
raised by defendants in their "Statement of the Facts"
we shall also answer the one or two law points urged by
defendants in their "Statement of Facts."
Defendants are highly critical of the trial court's
having believed and accepted the testimony of plaintiffs'
witnesses, but fail to recognize the nature and import of
the evidence that prompted the trial court to find find the
truth on the side of the plaintiffs. For example the attitude
of Walter Odendahl, a man of many years experience in
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all departments of coal mine operation (137), was not
one of antagonism to unions in general, or the United
Mine Workers of America in particular, but his financial
inability to meet the terms of a United Mine Workers contract (125, 142, 146, 147, 149, 153, 158, 164, 187, 188,
337). That was the reason Odendahl shut down the mine,
and it is the prerogative and constitutional righ·t of any
business man, with or without reason, to continue or discontinue in business as he sees fit; and no one is privileged to complain even though he does it deliberately to
avoid a labor dispute. (Tarr v. Amalgamated Ass'n. of
Street Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America,
Division 1055 et al (Idaho 1952), 250 P. 2d 904). The
trial court recognized this right of one to dispose of his
property and go out of business (139).
Defendants assert that there is evidence that Walter
Odendahl coerced three employees into terminating their
emF)Ioyment, and cites the testimony of the defendant Pecorelli as to what he was supposedly told by Reboil Motte
and the defendants Claron Golding and Faye Gene Olsen. The defendants Claron Golding and Faye Gene Olsen, who appeared in this cause as witnesses, did not
corroborate the testimony of Pecorelli. Mr. Reboil Motte
was never called as a witness. Those three employess of
Odendahl voluntarily severed their employment with the
Star Point Coal Co. (Exhibit E), under the circumstances as
stated by Odendahl (144).
Defendants refer to what they designate as a "socalled partnership" among the plaintiffs (Exhibit D), and
state that the question arises as to whether the lease from

3
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Odendahl to the partnership was bona fide or sham.
There is no evidence in the record to controvert the existence of the partnership, or establish that the lease was
not bona fide. Counsel for ·the defendants admitted, under the questioning of the trial court, that defendants had
nothing to show that the lease was merely a front (140),
and ·the trial court found the partnership and lease to be
bona fide, and "that in this good old U.S.A." the parties
had a right to enter into such relationship and plan of
operation (299).
rhat the plaintiff partnership, under an arrangement as found by the trial court that obviated the necessity of their having employees (299), could not accept the
usual contract of the United Mine Workers of America
embodying terms of seniority of employment, and requiring the re-employment of all former employees of
Walter Odendahl, is self-evident (129; 134; 135).
At this point it is appropriate to call attention to the
fact that defendants apparently have lost sight of their
antagonist. It is the plaintiffs with whom defendan·ts have
their quarrel. The plaintiffs have no employees - they
need none and want none. Odendahls who formerly
operated the mine with employees are no longer involved. For defendants to narrate the circumstances and argue the law as though the case were against Odendahls
is to miss the point entirely.
Defendants indicate that the ex-parte restraining order granted by the trial court was unlawful because of
non compliance with Sec. 34-1-28 U.C.A. 1953. The

4
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Utah Right to Work Law, 34-16-1 to 18, while no.t expressly negativing the application of the Labor Disputes
Act, Title 34, Chap. 1, U.C.A. 1953, is the la.test expression of the legislature, and is controlling as to iniunctive
relief under that Law; and if there is any conflict between
the two acts, the Right to Work Law supercedes the conflicting portion of the Labor Disputes Act. Hanson v. lnternatoinal Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 406, 79
So. 2d 199, (1955); 82 C.J.S., 489, Sec. 291; Bullen v.
Anderson, 81 Utah 151, 27 P. 2d 213.
Defendants contend that ·the plaintiffs, by taking
over the mine, assumed the alleged labor dispute between Odendahl and ,the United Mine Workers of America As has heretofore been stated, it was Odendahl's prerogative and constitutional right to discontinue his business; the trial court recognized that right (139); counsel
for the defendants admitted that defendants had nothing
to show that the lease was merely a fron1t (140); and the
trial court found the partnership and lease to be bona
fide (299). Under such circumstances, a successor cannot
be made to bear the burden of his predecessor's unfair
labor practices, if any existed. (Tarr v. Amalgamated
Ass'n. of Street Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of
America, Division 1055 et al, supra}. The cases cited by
defendants in support of their position to the contrary
(Brief, page 4), National Labor Relations Board vs. New
Madrid Manufacturing Co., 215 F (2d) 908; Regal Knitwear Co. vs. N.L.R.B. 324 U. S. 9, 65 S. Ct. 478; N.L.R.B.
vs. Atkins, 67 S Ct. 1265, 331 U. S. 398) simply do not
sustain any such proposition, as a reading of those parti-
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cular cases will demonstrate clearly.
Defendants next contend that there 1s a labor dispute existing in this case pursuant to Sec. 34-1-34, U.C.A.
1953, while the definitions controlling the interpretation
of the Labor Disputes Act provide:

34-1-2 Definitions -

When used in this act:
(9} The term "labor dispute" means any controversy between an employer and the majority
of his employees in a collective bargaining unit
concerning the right or process or details of collective bargaining or the designation of representatives.
No "labor dispute,. can exist under that definition, because the plaintiffs have no employees (206}.
The evidence is in conflict as to the purpose of the
picketing, and who was being picketed (204}. The trial
court found upon substantial evidence that the picketing
was coercive (284, 252}, enmeshed with violence, accompanied by threats (227, 228, 229, 254-55}, and for
an unlawful purpose. The picketing was coercive in that
it was conducted on a highway travelled by scarcely anyone other than the plaintiffs and the independent truckers
hauling coal from the mine to the railroad. The evidence
shows that the picketing could not, and did not, acquaint
the public and the people who travelled along said highway that there was an alleged labor dispute. (325-27)
Picketing under such existing cercumstances is not the exercise of free speech, it is coercion. Vogt, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, Respondent, vs. International Brother-
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hood of Teamsters, Local 695, et al. (Wise. 1956), 74 N.
2d 749.

w.

The picketing was enmeshed in violence-the blowing up of a bridge and the spreading of roofing nails on
the only road to plaintiffs' mine. While there is no direct
proof as to who was responsible for that destructive conduct, it is observed that the evidence shows that on the
morning following the damage to the bridge and the
spreading of the nails, ·the trucker Mr. Steineger was not
stopped or hailed as he approached the picket 'line- the
pickets just waved at him as he went through "over the
nails" (219) ,and when he got as far as the bridge he
found it was "blowed up"; whereas on the other occasion
he was stopped at the line by the pickets. Within one
week after Mr. Steineger testified, and after the trial
court granted a temporary injunction, the defendant Faye
Olsen shot into the radiator of Mr. Steineger's truck
and into 'the truck of the plaintiff Randall.
The picketing was accompanied by threatening language as found by the trial court, and was for the unlawful purpose of denying and abridging the right of the
plaintiffs to work on account of their non-membership in
a labor union.
Defendants complain because the trial court found
Pecorelli and Sacco were implicated in the picketing. Yet
the defendant Pecorelli, an executive board member of
the United Mine Workers of America, whose assignment
is the organization of non-union mines (177), told defendant Claron Golding to "put a picket line up there" (23839); received the reports of the pickets from day to day;
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informed the local unions that he visited regarding the
picket line; and thereby stimulated the picketing as admitted by his counsel (190). Defendant Frank Sacco, vicepresident of District 22 of the United Mine Workers of
America, also reported to ·the local unions that he attended on the progress of the picketing (258) and instructed the pickets (257).
The trial court was privileged to observe the witnesses, their candor, demeanor and fairness. For defendants
to argue that there was "ample evidence" or "evidence
to the effect" (Brief, page 6) that their testimony might
have been accepted by the trial court, is again to miss the
point. The court upon a satisfactory record believed the
plain'tiffs and disbelieved defendants. The record fully
justifies the inferences and conclusions reached, and the
issuance of a permanent injunction.

ARGUMENT
Point I

THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN
INJUNCTION IN THIS CASE REGARDLESS OF THE FEDERAL LAW.
A state court has jurisdiction in labor cases involving interstate commerce, notwithstanding the provisions
of the Federal Labor Relations Management Act (hereinafter referred to as l.M.R.A.) when either of the following
situations· prevail:
(1) Whenever the picketing or labor dispute involves

or results in violation of local matters of public safety and
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order such as violence, threats, blocking of highways or
violation of declared public policy; or
(2} Whenever the National Labor Relations Board
(hereinafter referred to as N.l.R.B.} under its "yardstick"
jurisdiction promulgation of 1954 refuses to take jurisdiction.
The law supporting situation (1} is well established.
State jurisdic,tion has always existed in cases involving
threats ,obstructing highways and local matters of public
s·afety and order, such as was found in the instant case
enmeshed with coercion, vio'lence, and the viola,tion of
the declared public policy of the State of Utah as expressed by its legislature in the Utah Right to Work law. The
law was reaffirmed as recently as June 4, 1956 by ,the
United States Supreme Court in United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers vs. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board 351 U. S. 266, 76 S. Ct.
794, in the following language:
There is no reason to re-examine the opinions
in which this Court has dealt with problems involving federal-state jurisdiction over industrial
controversies. They have been adequately summarized in Weber vs. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 348
U.S. 468, 474-477, 75 S. Ct. 480, 484-486, 99
L. ed. 546. As a general matter we have held that
a State may no't, in the furtherance of its public
policy, enjoin conduct "which has been made an
'unfair labor practice' under the federal statutes."
ld. 348 U.S. at p. 475, 75 S. Ct. at page 485 and
cases cited. But our post-Taft-Hartley opinions

9
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have made it clear that this general rule does not
take from the States power to prevent mass picketing, violence, and overt threats of violence. The
dominant interest of the State in preventing violence and property damage cannot be questioned. It is a matter of genuine local concern. Nor
should the fact that a union commits a federal unfair labor practice while engaging in violent conduct prevent States from taking steps to stop the
violence.
The States are the natural guardians of the
public against violence. It is the local communities that suffer most from the fear and loss occasioned by coercion and destruction .. We would
not interpret an Act of Congress to leave them
powerless to avert such emergencies without compelling directions to that effect.
To further emphasize the significance of this decision
we quote from the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas:
We disallowed that duplication of remedy in
Garner vs. Teamsters etc. Union 346 U. S. 485,
74 S. Ct. 161, 98 l. Ed. 228. Today we depart
from Garner and allow a state board to enjoin
action which is subject to an unfair labor proceeding before the federal board.
The law supporting situation (2) is likewise impressive. To merely state the query is to supply the answer:
Conceding federal jurisdiction to exist, if the federal government (N.l.R.B.) refuses to exercise jurisdiction in a
10
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labor dispute shall the parties then be left to "the law of
the jungle" because of alleged lack of jurisdiction by the
state courts?
One of the most recent well-reasoned cases supporting the position taken with respect to point (2) is that
of Lee Mark Metal Manufacturing Company vs. Local No.
596, 30 Labor Cases 69,968 (Pennsylvania, May 15,
1956) wherein it was held that state jurisdiction was proper in a case affecting interstate commerce where the
N.l.R.B refused to exercise its jurisdiction.
In the case now on appeal the mere fact that 40
per cent of the output of the plaintiffs' coal mine, while
being operated by Mr. Odendahl, found its way into interstate commerce, does not per se compel Federa·l jurisdiction or the operation of the L.M.R.A., and exclude state
jurisdiction. The L.M.R.A. is the only federal legislation
having pertinence to the issues involved in this case, and
accordingly Federal jurisdiction in this case must either
find its source in that act or it does not apply art a'll. The
burden of the L.M.R.A. is to invest the National Labor Relations Board with the administration and enforcement of
the provisions of the act in cases embraced by the act. It
is impor'tant to note that it is settled law that the N.L.R.B.
has the right and is empowered to prescribe the conditions upon which it will entertain jurisdiction of cases.
N.L.R.B. vs. Swinerton and Walberg Company, 202 Federal 2d 511.

11
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Prior to 1954, the N.L.R.B. apparently accepted and
rejected cases on a case-to-case basis, governing itself
according to the volume and extent of interstate commerce involved, the applicability or non-applicability of the
'de minimus' doctrine, and kindred considerations. On
July 1 and 15, 1954, however, t'he N.L.R.B., to remedy
this variable pattern of operation, promulgated a series
of dollar-volume standards as a 'yardstick' for determining if it would or would not invoke its jurisdiction in a given case. See: Commerce Clearing House Labor Law Reporter Vol 1, p. 1611, Sec. 161 0. Cases which do not conform to the minimum standards of the board's 'yardstick'
are no.t and will not be entertained or processed by the
board, notwithstanding that some interstate commerce is
involved. Inasmuch as the N.L.R.B. is constituted the sole
agency for the administration and enforcement of the act,
which, as has been previously noted, is the sole and only
es.tablishment of Federal jurisdiction in the premises such
as are here concerned, the promulgation by the board of
this jurisdictional 'yardstick' has created what has been
called a 'penumbral area' between Federal and State
jurisdiction. Thus it may be seen that the mere presence
of interstate commerce does not of itself give rise to the
applicability of the L.M.R.A. with the consequent envelopment of the cause by Federal jurisdiction.
Conformity with the board's jurisdictional 'yardstick'
must be shown in addition to the proof of involvement
of interstate commerce before the l.M.R.A. or Federal
jurisdiction thereunder may be invoked. There was no
such showing in this case. The only factor in the record

12
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is that approximately 40 per cent of the output of the
coal mine involved herein, under the operation of Odendahl, found its way into interstate commerce, and there
is no evidence whatsoever of the necessary 'yardstick'
qualifications of an actionable cause before the N.L.R.B.
Evidence was offered in the case at bar to show that a
charge was filed against Odendahl by some of his former employees with the N.l.R.B. (329-30), and that the
N.L.R.B. refused to exercise jurisdiction inasmuch as the
operations of the company involved were found predominan1tly local in charaCter, and it did not appear that it
would effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act to exercise jurisdiction. In the Garner and Weber cases (Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.
Ct. 161 and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348, U. S.
468) jurisdiction was expressly predicated on the presence of a cause which was cognizable by the N.L.R.B.,
and in the instant matter the absence of such a cause,
subject to the consideration of burden of proof, renders
those cases inapplicable. It is furfher noted that both the
Garner and Weber cases originated prior to the promulgation by the N.l.R.B. of its 'yardstick' policy.
The defendants had the burden of proof of establishing the necessary facts to disprove the jurisdiction of
the trial court to act in the premises. Where one seeks to
oust a state court from jurisdiction in an injunction proceeding in a labor dispute on the grounds of conflict of
jurisdiction, that person assumes and must bear the burden of proving such commerce as will invoke Federal jurisdiction. The defendants in this case failed to prove that
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their cause fell within the board's jurisdictional 'yardstick' and therefore their contention of conflict of jurisdiction does not have any validi,ty. In the Garner case itseJf 346 U. S. at page 488 the court clearly implied that
the absence of an actionable cause before the N.L.R.B.
leaves a state court free to act in the premises. If the case
does not fall within the jurisdictional 'yardstick' of the
N.L.R.B., jurisdiction is impliedly ceded to the state court.
When the N.LR.B. announces that it will refuse jurisdiction in certain types of cases, it states, by implication
at least, that the resolution of those matters cannot beeffectually had by its processes. "If then the state courts do
not 'take jurisdiction," as stated in the case of Ringling
Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., vs. Lewis, et al, New York Supreme Court, 135 N. Y. l. J. April
10, 1956, p. 7 (30 labor Cases 69,887}, "an area of employer-employee relationship reverts to the unsupervised
jungle where decisions go to the strong and ruthless."
See also a 1955 California Supreme Court case squarely
in point: J. S. Garmon et al vs. San Diego Building Trades
Council 291 P. 2d 1. See generally the case of Lee Mark
Metal Manufacturing Company vs. Local No. 596 lnterna'tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, supra, and cases cited therein.
It is, therefore, submitted that neither under the preemption doctrine nor under the interstate commerce docrine, was the trial court in this case without jurisdiction to
issue the injunction in this case, and to the contrary state
jurisdiction was proper by reason either of (1} the existence of violence, threats, and other violation of local law
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existing in this case, or (2) the refusal of the N.L.R.B. to
assume jurisdiction because of its jurisdictional 'yardstick'
doctrine.
Point II
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE ITS
PERMANENT INJUNCTION .HEREIN UNDER UTAH STATUTES.
As we understand defendants, they contend that the
trial court also lacked iurisdiction to issue its injunction
herein because of the provisions and limitations of the
Utah Labor Disputes Act, Ti~'le 34, Ch. 1, UCA 1953,
which is sometimes called the "Little Norris- LaGuardia
Act."
Our answer to this contention is two-fold:
(1) The Utah Right to Work Law, Laws of Utah 1955,
Ch. 54, Sec. 1, confers the power to issue injunctions
in such cases and the Utah Labor Dispute Act, if repugnant .to this later expression of our legislature on that
point, is repealed by implication.
We believe this Court will not find it necessary to
pass upon ·the constitutional question hereinafter stated
because of the well established law governing the first
portion of our answer now being set forth. The Utah
Right to Work Law specially recognizes the right of the
courts to issue injunctions in cases such as this one and
while the U'tah Right to Work Law does not expressly negative the application of the Utah Labor Disputes Act, it
is the latest expression of the legislature, and is control-
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ling as to injunctive relief under that law. If there is any
conflict between the two acts, the Right to Work Law
supercedes the conflidting portion of the so-called "Little
Norris- LaGuardia Act." See the case of Hanson v. International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 406, 79
So. 2d 199 (1955) involving the precise question and almost haec verba statutes as our two statutes above referred to:
"Where two legislative acts are repugnant to, or
in confi'lct with, each other the last one enacted
will govern, control, or prevail, and supercede
and impliedly repeal the earlier act although it
contains no repealing clause."
See also: 82 C.J.S. 489, Sec. 291, citing Bullen vs. Anderson, 81 Utah 151, 17 p. 2d 213, wherein it was held that
provisions of la,ter statutes prevail over conflicting provisions of an earlier statute.
(2) The Utah Labor Disputes Act in so far as it purports to limit or restrict the power of courts to issue injunctions is clearly an invasion by the legislature of jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution of the State of Utah
upon its courts of general jurisdiction and is therefore unconstitutional.
The provisions of the co-called "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act," in so far as they seek to limit the jurisdiction of the district courts of the State of Utah in the granting of relief by injuction, if that is necessary for the protection of rights and property, and to support the declared public policy of the State of Utah as expressed in
16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

its Right to Work Law, are illegal, ineffective and an unconstiltutional assumption of power by the 'legis'lature,
and an infringement upon the inherent right of the courts.
Article V, Sec. 1, Constitution of Utah provides:
"The powers of the governmen~t of the State of
Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise
of the powers properly be'longing to one of these
departments, shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases
herein expressly directed or permi:tted."
Article VIII, Sec. 1, Constitution of Utah provides:
"The Judicial power of the State shall be vested
in the Senate sitHng as a court of impeachment,
in a Supreme Court, in district cour'ts, in justices of
the peace, and such other courts inferior to the
Supreme Court as may be established by law."
Article VIII, Sec. 7, Constitution of Utah provides:
"The district courts or any judge thereof, shall
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, cer,tiorari, prohibition and other writs necessary to carry into
effect their orders, judgments and decrees, and to
give them a general control over inferior courifs
and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions."
The framers of the Constitution expressly conferred
upon the courts and reserved unto them the power to is-
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sue the writs mentioned in the Constitution, one of which
writs is that of injunction. If :they had intended that the
courts should have such power as may be prescribed by
law, and to issue writs of injunction as may be defined
by the legislature, they would have sa:.d so. See: State ex
rei. Robinson v. Durand, 36 Utah 93, 104 Poe. 760,
where the Court said:

" . . . If it is within the power of the legislature to enlarge the office of the writ, it must also
be within its power to abridge it. If such power
to enlarge and abridge exists, then the power of
courts to issue the writs, and the cases to which
they may apply, are wholly dependent upon the
wil'l and discretion of the legislature. In such
cases the power of courts to issue the writs is as
by statute provided, and not as provided by the
Constitution. . . . "
And .the Court held that the legislature could not break
in upon the Constitution or encroach upon the prerogative of courts, and that its enactment extending and enlarging the office of the writ of prohibition was void.
The power conferred upon the courts by the Constitution
cannot be enlarged or abridged by the legislature.
See Blanchard vs. Golden Age Brewing Company
(Washington, 1936) 63 P. (2d) 397 holding under constitutional provisions practically identical with ours and labor Disputes Act also practically identical with ours that
the latter was unconstitutional in so far as it purpor'ted to
limit or restrict the powers of the court of equity to issue
injunctions in labor disputes:
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"Thus, by constitution and independently of any
legislative enactment, the judicial power over
cases in equity has been vested in fhe courts, and,
in 1the absence of any constitutional provisions to
the contrary, such power may not be abrogated
or restricted by the legislative department" page

405.
The rationale back of this line of authorities is
brought in sharp relief when one considers the federal
judicial structure. In the federal field the Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932) provided that:
"No court of the United States, as herein defined,
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary injunction in a case invo'lving or
growing out of a labor dispute except in strict
conformity with the provisions of such sections."
29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 101.
But Section 113 {d) of that Act defines court of the United
States as:
"The term 'court of the United States' means any
court of the United States whose iurisdiction has
been or may be conferred or defined or limited
by Act of Congress."
It is clear, as Mr. Justice Stone sta,ted in Lockerty vs.
Phillips 319 U.S. 238,63 S. Ct. 1019, "The congressional
power to ordain and establish inferior courts includes the
power of investing them with jurisdiction ei,ther limited,
concurrent or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction
from them in the exact degrees and character which to
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Congress may seem proper for the public good."
The only Cour~t created by our United States Constitution is the Supreme Court itself. All other courts including U. S. District and Circuit Courts of Appeal are es··
tablished by Congressional Act.
The District Courts of the State of Utah, unlike inferior Uni'ted States courts, obtained their power to issue
Injunctions from the constitution. The legislature may not
restrict that power.
Defendants further contend the injunction issued in
this case was too sweeping in its terms. The trial court in
the instant case found that no picket line could be maintained in view of what had happened without its
having the advantage of a coercive influence, and that
the permanent injunction granted was restricted to the
situation as i·t exists, with the plaintiffs operating their
mine under the arrangement that it is now being operated under (398). Such finding by the trial court, and its
granting of a permanent injunction, is the same realistic appraisal as that of the court in the case of Morris vs.
Local Union No. 494 of Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butchers Workmen of Spokane et al, 234 P. 2d 543
(Wash. 1951). To accept the defendants claim that the
reason for picketing the plaintiffs' coal mine was that
the picket line contributed to the free enterchange of
thought and communication of ideas and factual information, and that it was not to coerce the plaintiffs into
signing a 'take it or leave it' contract offered by the union (116), and to deprive them of the liberty of lawfully
conducting their business in the only manner that 1 in
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their judgmen~t {129), it could be profitably conducted,
would be to put reality aside. Peaceful picketing, which
the facts in the instant case belie, for an unlawful purpose, that is, in contravention of the "right to work" policy of the State, as in this case, can be legally enjoined.
Hanson v. International Union of OperatingEngineers
Local No. 406, supra, (1955); Woodard et al vs. Collier
et al, 78 S. E. 2d 526 (1953).
Point Ill
THE PICKETING HEREIN WAS NOT PEACEFUL, AND
WAS FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE.
The contention of defendants is that the trial court
disregarded all of the evidence of the defendants and
gave credence to the plaintiffs' testimony in toto. Afforded the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, and occupying the advantageous position of determining their credibility and the weight to be given to
their testimony, the trial court found threats in wha't the
pickets said when they stopped certain of the p'laintiffs
and an independent trucker. The evidence amply and
clearly preponderates in support of that finding.
Plaintiffs submit that men, in the normal course of
their lives, react to current situations in the light of their
past experience and accumulated knowledge. In a realistic approach to the subject of picketing, the individual
reactions of those picketed, or those indirectly affected
by the picketing, cannot be divorced from their past experience. As stated in the dissenting opinion in State vs.
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Washington ex rei Lumber and Sawmill Workers v. Superior Court, 164, P. 2d 662 (1945), cited by the defendants, picketing, whether peaceful or otherwise, is nothing less than economic pressure, economic coercion, or
economic warfare, whichever of those terms may be the
most suitable to the particular occasion, and members of
the public endeavor to keep as far away from it as possible in order to avoid embarrassing situations. The reactions of the witnesses in this case to the statements
made by the pickets, were entirely normal under the circumstances and fully justified, and the trial court so
found (300).
From all of the evidence introduced, the court could
well find, as it did (397), that the picketing of plaintiffs'
mine was enmeshed in violence - the blowing up of a
bridge and the scattering of nails, and the shooting of
cars. Defendants complain of the admission by the trial
court (391) of the evidence offered by plaintiffs of the
shooting of trucks by the defendant Faye Olsen (308). The
record disCloses (309) t'hat the trial court was fully advised that it was a matter within its sound discretion to
determine whether the incident was so closely related,
by virtue of the time or the act done, as to be admissable,
and was cited 31 C. J. S. 872-73, Sec. 162:
"Evidence of facts which happened before or
after the transaction in issue, but which relate
directly to it, may be admissable, as where they
were, or probably may have been, the cause or
effect of a fact in issue."
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But aside from the above considerations as to
whether or not the picketing in the instan.t case was
peaceful or otherwise, it was not for a lawful purpose
and could therefore be enjoined.
The picketing of plaintiffs' mine was illegal conduct
contrary to the declared public policy of the State of Utah
as expressed in the Utah Right to Work Law, Laws of
Utah 1955, Ch. 54, Sec. 1, (34-16-2 U.C.'A. 1953):
"Public policy.-lt is hereby declared to be the
public policy of the state of Utah that the right
of persons to work, whether in private employment or for the s~tate of Utah, its counties, cities,
school districts, or other political subdivisions,
shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or nonmembership in any labor
union, labor organization or any other type of
association; further, that the right to live includes
the right to work. The exercise of the right to
work must be protected and maintained free from
undue restrain·ts and coercion."
In Building Service Employees International Union, Local
262, vs. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532, the court said:
"The public policy of any state is to be found in
its constitution, acts of the legislature, and decisions of its courts. Primarily it is for the law makers to determine the public policy of the State."
and it was held that a state is permitted to enjoin peaceful picketing which is in violation of the state's public pol-
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icy. And to the same effect see Marcus Heath et al vs.
Motion Picture Machine Operators Union No. 170, 290
S. W. 2d 152 {1956); and Hanson v. International Union
of Operating Engineers Local No. 406, supra, (1955).
See also Local Union No. 10 et al v. Graham et al,
345 U. S. 192, 73 S. Ct. 585 {March 16, 1953) wherein
the Court stated "The basic question here is whether the
Commonwealth of Virginia, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, may enjoin peaceful picketing when it is carried on for purposes in confilct with the
Virginia Right to Work Statute." The Court answered
this question in fhe affirmative.
POINT IV
NOT ALL PEACEFUL PICKETING IS THE LEGITIMATE
EXERCI'SE OF FREE SPEECH, AND PEACEFUL PICKETING
TO INDUCE PLAINTIFFS, WHO OPERATE WITHOUT OUTSIDE HElP, TO JOIN UNION WAS ILLEGAL, CONTRARY
TO PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND COULD
BE ENJOINED.
One of the cases cited by defendants, in the light of
the development of the law as related to the assimilation
of picketing to the right of free speech, is almost prophetic. Se: International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 115 Utah 183, 203
P. 2d 404, wherein this Court said:
"It may be noted here that none of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight
amendments to the Constitution of the United
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States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state. To consider
them as absolutes would be, in effect, to deny to
the states any police power.
And,
"Like the other fundamental rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, the right of free speech is, and
always has been, subject to reasonable regulation by the state when it collides with more paramount public interest."
And,
"It must be recognized that picketing, as an exercise of the right of free speech, is subject to police regulation by the state. We are aware of no
decision, either of the Supreme Cour:t of the United States, or of any state court, which has either
he'ld or inferred to t'he contrary. In fact in nearly
every opinion treating the subject which has come
to our attention, the cour:t has specifically pointed
out the right of the state to regulate picketing."
And,
"The cases in the Supreme Court of the United
States in regard to t'he relation of picketing to free
speech under varying situations, if not in unstable
equilibrium, are not completely stabilized, and
necessarily so because in this field of the law,
labor's right on the one hand to communicate information or persuade through picket line technique, and on the other hand the rights of the
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employer or of the public are in delicate balance,
if not in opposition. The law may be pronounced
only according to various factual situations as
they are presented on review."
This Court clearly took a very cautious position that would
enable it to conform to the growth of the law upon this
novel concept of the right of free speech as related to
picketing. The growth of the law during the past six years
has eminently justified this Court's considered restraint.
What has been most descriptively designated as "The
Shriveling of the Doctrine" of free speech has devoleped.
See: Labor Relations and the Law, (little Brown & Co.,
Boston, 1953) page 756. Picketing is no longer considered as purely free speech, but as a distinct entity, and al.though one of its elements is recognized as communication, this element is but one of many to be considered.
See: Utah Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, page 98, (1956)
uPeaceful Picketing and Free Speech in State Courts:
1949-56."
In Hanke et al v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local
309, et al, 207 P.2d 206, (Wash. 1949), the Court found
that there was little, if any, dispute in the evidence. The
respondents and his three sons were operating a co-partnership business in the city of Seattle, under the firm name
of Atlas Auto Rebuild. They had no employees in the operation of any part of their business, but themselves alone
did all the work and labor connected therewith. A system
of peaceful picketing of the respondents' place of business was instituted by the Union in order to compel the
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respondents to confine themselves to shorter hours of
business and limited periods as demanded by the Union.
The conr·tolling question, as stated by the Supreme Court
of Washington was: whether or not, under the facts of the
case, the granting of injunctive relief by the tria'l court
against the appellant union and its representatives violated the provision of the Federal constitution forbidding the
abridgement of freedom of speech. The Supreme Court of
Washington found that the purpose of the picketing was
to indirectly compel the respondents to become members
of the Union, and directly to coerce fhe respondents to enter into an agreement under which they would carry on
their business only during those hours and days arbitrarily fixed by fhe Union. The Court found and declared that
the picketing activity conducted by the Union constituted
coercion and was therefore unlawful.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Washington
was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in lnte·rnational Brotherhood of Teamsters, ChauHeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local 309, ~t al., v. A. E.
Hanke et al, May 8, 1950, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773, 13
ALR2d 631. Many of the authorities relied upon by defendants in their brief in the instant case were distinguished, and the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, said:

"* * * we must start with the fact that while
picketing has an ingredient of communication it
cannot dogmatically be equated with the constitutionally protected freedom of speech. Our de-

27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cisions reflect recognition that picketing is indeed
a hybrid!'. Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 18 (1949). See also Jaffe, In Defense
of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41
Mich L Rev 1 037 (1943). The effort in the cases has
been to strike a balance between the constitutional protection of the element of communicaion in
picketing and the 'power of the State to set the
limits of permissable contest open to industrial
combatants.' Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88,
104, 84 L. ed 1093, 1103, 60 S.Ct. 736. A State's
judgment on striking such a balance is of course
subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amend
ment. Embracing as such a judgment does, however, a State's social and economic policies, which
in turn depend on knowledge and appraisal of
local social and economic factors, such judgment
on these matters comes to this Court bearing a
weighty title of respect.
"These two cases emphasize the nature of a problem that is presented by our duty of sitting in
judgment on a State's judgment in striking the
balance that has to be struck when a State decides
not 'to keep hands off these industrial contests.
Here we have a glaring instance of the interplay
of competing social-economic interests and viewpoints. Unions obviously are concerned not to
have union standards undermined by non-union
shops. This interest penetrates into self-employer
shops. On the other hand, some of our profound-
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est thinkers from Jefferson to Brandeis have stressed the impor.tance to a democratic society of encouraging self-employer economic units as a
counter-movement to what are deemed to be the
dangers inherent in excessive concentration of economic power. 'There is a widespread belief ... ,
that the true prosperity of our past came not from
big business, but through the courage, the energy
and the ~esourcefulness of small men; . . . ; andi
that only through participation by the many in
the responsibilities and de:terminations of business, can Americans secure the moral and intellectual deve'lopment which is essential to the
maintenance of liber:ty.'

"* * * when one considers that issues not unlike those that are here have been simi 1arly viewed by other States and by the Congress of the
United States, we cannot conclude that Washington, in holding the picketing in these cases to be
for an unlawful object, has struck a balance so
inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free people
that it must be found an unconstitutional choice.
Mindful as we are that a phase of picketing is
communication, we cannot find that Washington
has offended the Constitution.
1

In Morris v. Local Union No. 494 of Amalgamated
Meet Cutters and Butcher Workmen of Spokane et al,
supra (Wash. 1951 ), it was held that picketing which was
coercive and intended to force either a self-employer or
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his wife to join a union, and to force the employer to compel any employees to join the union, regardless of their
personal desires, would be enjoined as contrary to the
public policy of the state. The court said:
"To claim as the reason for picketing Morris's
business establishment that the picket line contributed to the free interchange of thought and
communication of ideas and factual information
in the city of Spokane, and t'hat it was not to coerce Morris into signing the 'take it or leave it'
contract offered by the union, is to put reality
aside. That contract, as the trial court found,
would compel Morris or his wife to join the union,
and would require Morris to compel his employees, if any, to join the union."
In Torr v. Amalgamated Ass'n. of Street Electric Ry.

& Motor Coach Employees of America, Division 1055 et al,
supra, the plaintiff purchased certain equipment and leased other facilities from a transit company and commenced
operations on his own responsibility on a permit from the
city. The plaintiff had been the business manager of the
transit company, and had participated in the negotiations
over the dispute between the company and the defendant
union. The plaintiff had entered into a conditional sales
contract with the transit company wherein he purchased
the motor vehicles of the company; paid nothing down
but agreed to pay $600.00 per month. The defendant union picketed the plaintiff, who secured an injunction. The
defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court of Idaho in
affirming the injunction said:
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"There being no labor dispute and the picketing
being unlawful, the acts of the defendants were
not protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and
the court was not restricted by the constitution or
otherwise in the issuing of an injunotion and has
jurisdiction so to do."
SeeWoodard et al v. Collier et al, 78 S.E. 2d 526 (1953).
In Hanson v. International Union of Operating Engineers
Local No. 406, supra, (1953), it was held that peaceful
picketing for an unlawful purpose, that is, in contravention of the "right to work" policy of the State, cou'ld be
legally enjoined.
In Building Service Employees International Union,
Local 262, v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, the court said:
"This Court has said that picke'ting is an exercise
of the right of free speech guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution. * * * But since picketing is
more than speech and establishes a locus in quo
that has far more poten,tia'l for inducing action or
nonaction than the message the pickets convey,
this Court has not hesitated to uphold a state's
restraint of acts and conduct which are an abuse
of the right to picket rather than a means of
peaceful and truthful publicity. * * *."
In Marcus Heath et al v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union No. 170, supra, (1956), it was held that to
induce the co-owner of a theatre to cease operating a
projection machine and to hire a union member in his
·place was against state public policy and was properly
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enjoined, since the co-owner, who was ineligible for union membership, was entitled to 'the same immunity as
would have to be accorded a one-man business in which
the businessman-proprietor performed all his work without the assistance of employees.
The defendants construe the words "peaceful persuasion" as synonomous with "peaceful picketing". The
au,thorities above cited cannot be harmonized with such
contention, for it is recognized that even peaceful picketing, while it has ingredients of communication, is a form
of economic coercion having far more potential than mere
speech.
CONCLUSION

Without repeating the specific points above enumerated and argued, we submit that both the law and the
facts in this case amply support the decision of the able
and discerning trial judge.
Respectfully submitted,
S. J. SWEETRING
A ttomey far Respondents
Silvagni Building
Price, Utah
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